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Abstract
We assess the international spillovers of US monetary policy with a large-scale global 
VAR which models the world economy as a network of interdependent countries. An 
expansionary US monetary policy shock contributes to the emergence of a Global Financial 
Cycle, which boosts macroeconomic activity worldwide. We also find that economies with 
floating exchange rate regimes are not fully insulated from US monetary policy shocks and, 
even though they appear to be relatively less affected by the shocks, the differences 
in responses across exchange rate regimes are not statistically significant. The role 
of US monetary policy in driving these macrofinancial spillovers gets even reinforced by 
the complex network of interactions across countries, to the extent that network effects 
roughly double the direct impacts of US monetary policy surprises on international equity 
prices, capital flows, and global growth. This amplification increases as countries get more 
globally integrated over time, suggesting that the evolving network is an important driver 
for the increasing role of US monetary policy in shaping the Global Financial Cycle.
Keywords: trilemma, Global Financial Cycle, monetary policy spillovers, network effects. 
JEL classification: C32, E52, F40.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza los efectos macrofinancieros globales derivados de la política monetaria 
de Estados Unidos mediante la estimación de un modelo de vector autorregresivo global 
(GVAR), que presenta la economía mundial como una red de países interdependientes. 
Un shock expansivo de la política monetaria de Estados Unidos contribuye a la aparición de un 
ciclo financiero global, que impulsa la actividad económica en todo el mundo. Se destaca 
que las economías con regímenes de tipo de cambio flexibles no están completamente 
aisladas de los shocks de política monetaria de Estados Unidos y, aunque parecen estar 
relativamente menos afectadas, las diferencias en las respuestas entre regímenes de tipos 
de cambio no son estadísticamente significativas. El papel de la política monetaria de 
Estados Unidos se ve incluso reforzado por la compleja red de interacciones entre países, 
en la medida en que los efectos de la red duplican aproximadamente los impactos directos 
de las sorpresas de la política monetaria en los precios internacionales de las acciones, 
los flujos de capital y el crecimiento global. Esta amplificación aumenta a medida que los 
países se integran más a escala global con el tiempo, lo que sugiere que la evolución 
de la red es determinante para el papel cada vez más relevante de la política monetaria de 
Estados Unidos en la configuración del ciclo financiero global.
Palabras clave: trilema, ciclo financiero global, efectos spillover de la política monetaria, 
efectos de red.
Códigos JEL: C32, E52, F40.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1942
1 Introduction
The literature on the international transmission of monetary policy has traditionally em-
phasized that economies with a flexible exchange rate regime are more insulated than
those which constrain their monetary policy to pegging their exchange rate to a reference
currency, a reflection of the classical Mundellian Trilemma according to which a country
can attain just two of three objectives among exchange rate stability, free capital mobility,
and independent monetary policy.1 The Trilemma has been recently put into question by
Rey (2013) and subsequently Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2019), which document that
US monetary policy triggers an extraordinarily high comovement in international finan-
cial variables — a Global Financial Cycle — which affects the monetary conditions of any
economy regardless of its exchange rate regime, as long as cross-border capital flows are
free and macroprudential policies are not employed.
Consistently with the logic of the Global Financial Cycle, the communication of the
Fed explicitly recognizes the relevant role of its actions in affecting the global economy
and, importantly, it recurrently emphasizes the importance of assessing potential spillback
effects from its own policies. This point has been made clear for instance by the former
Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Mr. Stanley Fischer,
“And of course, actions taken by the Federal Reserve influence economic
conditions abroad. Because these international effects in turn spill back on
the evolution of the U.S. economy, we cannot make sensible monetary policy
choices without taking them into account.” Fischer (2014)
Since US monetary policy endogenously responds to the global consequences of its own
measures,2 the natural question is to what extent the role of US monetary policy in driv-
1See for instance Mundell (1963) and Obstfeld et al. (2005). In this context, Shambaugh (2004),
Obstfeld et al. (2019), and several references therein have shown that countries with flexible exchange
rates feature short-term interest rates which correlate less with the base country interest rates.
2In the context of monetary policies of advanced economies, a similar argument has been made by Shin
(2015): “There is much talk of “headwinds” from emerging markets buffeting the advanced economies, but
the tendency is to speak of these headwinds as if they had come out of the blue... ...these headwinds are
the result of monetary policy actions taken some time ago, in the emerging market economies but also
by precisely those advanced economies being buffeted by these headwinds”, and by Carney (2019): “And
while it is unrealistic to expect advanced economy policymakers to internalise fully spillovers from their
2
ing the Global Financial Cycle gets amplified by spillback effects and, more generally, by
the complex network of cross-country interactions that arise in a highly integrated global
economy.3 We tackle this question by assessing the intern ional spillovers of US mo e-
tary policy with an estimated global VAR (GVAR), a multi-country empirical framework
which models the global economy as a network of interdependent countries which account
altogether for more than 90% of world GDP. The model allows to investigate whether the
effects of US monetary olicy shocks get am lified by the complex network f interactions
among receiver countries, as well as by spillback effects from countries in the rest of the
world to the US. We identify US monetary policy shocks using theory-based sign restric-
tions on selected responses of US variables, while at the same time leaving unrestricted
the responses of all variables in the rest of countries so to allow for an agnostic identifi-
cation strategy about the size and sign of international spillovers. We explicitly consider
both conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures, the latter intended as
a broad mix of measures and communication aimed at affecting the yield spread while
leaving at the same time the policy rate unchanged in the spirit of Baumeister and Benati
(2013), so to provide a comprehensive picture of US monetary policy actions.
We show that unexpected expansionary US monetary policy surprises contribute to
the emergence of a Global Financial Cycle that boosts macroeconomic activity worldwide,
regardless of whether the monetary easing is achieved by a conventional drop in the policy
rate or by a compression of the yield spread. Importantly, macro-financial spillovers are
economically and statistically significant even in economies with floating exchange rate
regimes and, if anything, having a flexible exchange rate provides just a partial insulation
to foreign shocks. Bringing support to recent findings in Miranda-Agrippino and Rey
(2019), our results are consistent with the idea that shifts in monetary policy of the hege-
mon economy, the United States, generate a global synchronization of financial variables
which affects all countries altogether. Importantly though, we also show that the role
actions on emerging markets, given their domestic mandates, advanced economies monetary policies will
increasingly need to take account of spillbacks”.
3In this respect, Obstfeld (2019) argue that the particular structure of international financial markets
implies that the actions of the Federal Reserve are likely to propagate powerfully abroad, with important
potential spillbacks onto the US economy itself.
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effects of US monetary policy shocks get amplified by the complex network of interactions
among receiver countries, as well as by spillback effects from countries in the rest of the
world to the US. We identify US monetary policy shocks using theory-based sign restric-
tions on selected responses of US variables, while at the same time leaving unrestricted
the responses of all variables in the rest of countries so to allow for an agnostic identifi-
cation strategy about the size and sign of international spillovers. We explicitly consider
both conventional and unconventional monetary policy measures, the latter intended as
a broad mix of measures and communication aimed at affecting the yield spread while
leaving at the same time the policy rate unchanged in the spirit of Baumeister and Benati
(2013), so to provide a comprehensive picture of US monetary policy actions.
We show that unexpected expansionary US monetary policy surprises contribute to
the emergence of a Global Financial Cycle that boosts macroeconomic activity worldwide,
regardless of whether the monetary easing is achieved by a conventional drop in the policy
rate or by a compression of the yield spread. Importantly, macro-financial spillovers are
economically and statistically significant even in economies with floating exchange rate
regimes and, if anything, having a flexible exchange rate provides just a partial insulation
to foreign shocks. Bringing support to recent findings in Miranda-Agrippino and Rey
(2019), our results are consistent with the idea that shifts in monetary policy of the hege-
mon economy, the United States, generate a global synchronization of financial variables
which affects all countries altogether. Importantly though, we also show that the role
actions on emerging markets, given their domestic mandates, advanced economies monetary policies will
increasingly need to take account of spillbacks”.
3In this respect, Obstfeld (2019) argue that the particular structure of international financial markets
implies that the actions of the Federal Reserve are likely to propagate powerfully abroad, with important
potential spillbacks onto the US economy itself.
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of US monetary policy in driving these macro-financial spillovers get even reinforc d by
network effects, which roughly do ble the direct impacts of US mo etary policy surprises
on international equity prices, capital flows, and global growth. We also document that
this amplification increases as countries get more globally integrated over time, suggest-
ing that the evolution of the network is an important driver of the increasing role of US
monetary policy in shaping the Global Financial Cycle.
As anticipated, our results are closely related to the recent work by Miranda-Agrippino
and Rey (2019), which find evidence of powerful financial spillovers of US monetary policy
to the res of the world, even in those countr es with a floating exchange ate regime. They
reach to this conclusion by estimating a large-scale Bayesian VAR which includes several
macro-financial indicators for the US, as well as several equivalent indicators for the world
(or alternatively, for the subset of independently floating exchange rate countries), the
latter computed as cross-sectional sums of country-specific variables. While this study
treats the rest of the world as a homogeneous economy, we explicitly model it as the con-
glomerate of interconnected heterogeneous economies. In particular, each economy in the
GVAR is represented by a VAR model that includes both domestic and economy-specific
external variables, where the latter are meant to reflect the relative importance of the
other countries for the given economy. By allowing for heterogeneity across economies
we can obtain the full distribution of country-specific spillover effects rather than a sin-
gle point for the aggregate. But more importantly, by allowing for connections among
economies we find that the network is a relevant amplifier of the US monetary impulse,
for both domestic and spillover effects. Our result is consistent with recent analysis in
Georgiadis (2017), which shows that abstracting from higher-order transmission channels
induced by interactions among countries may lead to underestimated spillovers. In this
respect, Dedola et al. (2017) employ a two-step strategy which consists of estimating
first the US monetary policy shock, identified via theory-based sign restrictions, using
a large-scale Bayesian VAR including US and global (aggregate) variables, then running
batteries of independent country- and variable-specific regressions on the estimated shock.
This paper finds sizable macro-financial spillovers of US monetary policy, and no clear-cut
systematic relation between country responses and the exchange rate flexibility. While
4
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confirming these results, we show that accounting for interdependencies across countries
provides a more powerful picture of US monetary policy regarding the magnitude of its
estimated effects.4
Our empirical approach is closer to research which has already successfully employed
GVAR models to study the international transmission of US monetary policy shocks,
the latter being typically identified using sign restrictions on impulse responses as in
our analysis. Georgiadis (2016) finds that an unexpected US monetary policy tightening
significantly depresses output globally, spillovers for some countries are even larger than
domestic effects, and economies with a floating exchange rate feature smaller effects. Also
using the same framework, Feldkircher and Huber (2016) compares spillovers stemming
from demand, supply, and monetary policy of the US, and find that a monetary policy
tightening produces particularly negative output effects across countries. Chen et al.
(2016) also employ a GVAR to show that US Quantitative Easing measures, proxied by
reductions in the US term and corporate spreads identified via recursive Cholesky schemes,
prevented the US and other advanced economies from prolonged recession and deflation,
and that spillover effects are particularly large in emerging economies. While broadly
confirming results of these studies, our novel contribution is to document that these
global macroeconomic spillovers are intrinsically connected with the emergence of a Global
Financial Cycle, which stems from the US monetary policy surprise and strengthens via
the global network, with important spillback effects onto the US economy itself.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical setup: the
GVAR model, the data and the specification of the model, the identification strategy, and
the estimation. Section 3 presents the results of the analysis. Section 4 concludes.
4In the same vein, Burriel and Galesi (2018) find for the euro area that the effects of unconventional
monetary policy measures are substantially lower when not accounting for interactions among members
of the currency union. Our finding about the relevance of worldwide network effects also connects with
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2009) which analyze the transmission of US monetary policy shocks to global
equity markets and find that what determines the magnitude of transmission is not a country’s bilateral
integration with the United States, but rather its global integration vis-ï£¡-vis all other countries.
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2 Empirical Methodology
2.1 The GVAR Model
The analysis is based on the GVAR modeling framework as firstly developed in Pesaran
et al. (2004) and further extended in Dées et al. (2007). The GVAR model is a system
of national VAR models in which cross-country interactions are explicitly taken into ac-
count. Being a multi-country model, the GVAR deals with country heterogeneities in
a simple and effective way, thus allowing for assessing asymmetries in the international
transmission of monetary policy shocks. Specifically, each national economy i is modeled
as a VARX(pi,qi),
Yit = ai + bit+
pi∑
j=1
AijYi,t−j +
qi∑
j=0
BijY
∗
i,t−j +
qi∑
j=0
CijXt−j + uit (1)
where ai and bi are vectors of variable-specific coefficients associated to a constant and a
time trend, respectively; Aij, Bij, and Cij are matrices of coefficients; and uit is a vector of
idiosyncratic country-specific shocks which are assumed to be serially uncorrelated zero-
mean processes with full variance-covariance matrix Σii. The vector Yit includes domestic
variables which represent the domestic macro-financial conditions of the economy. The
vector Y ∗it contains country-specific foreign variables which capture, for each economy
i, the influence of its main economic partners. These variables are calculated as cross-
sectional averages of the corresponding domestic variables of the other j countries,
Y ∗it =
∑
j =i
wijYjt with
∑
j =i
wij = 1 (2)
where weights wij are generally based on bilateral trade flows or alternatively on bilateral
measures of financial exposure.5 The vector Xt includes global variables which affect all
countries at the same time, such as oil prices. Global variables follow the process
Xt = ax + bxt+
px∑
j=1
DjXt−j +
qx∑
j=0
FjY˜t−j + uxt (3)
5Being constructed as cross-sectional averages, country-specific foreign variables allow to overcome
the curse of dimensionality that would occur if variables of each individual foreign country had to be
included. In practice, foreign variables resemble factors extracted by statistical dimension-reduction
techniques such as in Forni et al. (2000) and Stock and Watson (2002), but where loading coefficients are
known and informed by data on trade or financial flows.
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wher ax a d bx are vectors of coefficients associated to a constant nd a time trend; Dj
and Fj are m tr es f coefficient ; and uxt is a v c or of reduced form residuals which
are assumed to be serially uncorrelated zero-mean processes with full variance-covariance
matrix Σxx. The vector Y˜t is composed by weighted averages of all countries’ domestic
variables, where weights are based on the relative importance of each country in the world
economy (GDP shares), and capture the feedback effects from all countries to the global
variables.
In this setting, the sets of foreign (Y ∗it ) and global (Xt) variables capture the external
dimension of each economy and channel the effects of foreign shocks, such as a US mon-
etary policy surprise, onto the domestic macro-financial conditions. In this respect, it is
worth noticing that the specification in (1) is flexible enough to embed simpler frame-
works. For instance, cross-country bilateral interactions can be precluded by setting to
zero the weight of any foreign economy j with respect to each country i, wij = 0, so that
the set of country-specific foreign variables disappears from (1). By additionally setting
to unity each economy-specific weight with respect to the US, wi,US = 1, equation (2)
implies that the foreign variables of each given economy i coincide with the US variables,
Y ∗it = YUS,t. Hence in this case a US monetary policy shock affects other countries just
directly, in the sense that the shock does not propagate via bilateral interactions among
countries in the rest of the world. This specification is typically employed in the litera-
ture, see for instance Dedola et al. (2017) and Iacoviello and Navarro (2019), and we will
explicitly compare results from such a setting when assessing the role of the network as
amplifier of the US monetary impulse.
In order to obtain the final representation of the GVAR, we can exploit the fact that
country-specific foreign variables are linear combinations of the endogenous variables,
Y ∗it = WiYt, where Yt = (Y ′1t, . . . , Y ′Nt)′ and Wi are country-specific matrices based on
weights wij which capture interconnections across countries. Hence we can write each
country-specific model as
Gi0Yt = ai + bit+
pi∑
j=1
GijYt−j +
qi∑
j=0
CijXt−j + uit (4)
where Gi0 = (I −Bi0Wi) and Gij = (Aij +BijWi). We can then stack all country-specific
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models to obtain
G0Yt = a+ bt+
p∑
j=1
GjYt−j +
q∑
j=0
CjXt−j + ut (5)
where ut = (u′1t, . . . , u′Nt)′, G0 = (G′10, . . . , G′N0)′, a = (a′1, . . . , a′N)′, b = (b′1, . . . , b′N)′,
Gj = (G′1j, . . . , G′Nj)′, Cj = (C ′1j, . . . , C ′Nj)′, p = max(pi), and q = max(qi).
Moreover, given that the feedback variables are GDP-based weighted averages of the
country-specific variables, Y˜t = W˜Yt, where W˜ is a matrix defined by the GDP shares,
we can write the GVAR as
H0Zt = h0 + h1t+
p∑
j=1
HjZt−j + et (6)
where the vector Zt = (Y ′t , X ′t)′ includes all country-specific and common variables, and
H0 =
[
G0 −C0
−F0W˜ I
]
, h0 =
[
a
ax
]
, h1 =
[
b
bx
]
, Hj =
[
Gj Cj
FjW˜ Dj
]
, et =
[
ut
uxt
]
.
The vector et = (u′t, u′xt)′ collects all residuals, with variance-covariance matrix Σ, defined
by,
Σ =

Σ11 Σ12 · · · Σ1N Σ1x
Σ21 Σ22 · · · Σ2N Σ2x
... ... . . . ... ...
ΣN1 ΣN2 · · · ΣNN ΣNx
Σx1 Σx2 · · · ΣxN Σxx

where cross-country covariances Σij are defined as Σij = cov(uit, ujt) = E(uitu′jt) and a
typical element of Σij, denoted by σij,ls, measures the covariance of the lth variable in
country i with the sth variable in country j.6
Provided that the H0 matrix is invertible, we can obtain the GVAR(p) in its reduced
form,
Zt = k0 + k1t+
p∑
j=1
KjZt−j + vt (7)
where k0 = H−10 h0, k1 = H−10 h1, Kj = H−10 Hj, and vt = H−10 et are reduced form shocks
with zero mean and full variance-covariance matrix Ω = H−10 Σ(H−10 )′.
6Notice that country-specific shocks are allowed to be cross-sectionally correlated due to spatial or
contagion effects that are not totally eliminated by the global and country-specific foreign variables.
Nonetheless, as explained in Pesaran et al. (2004) residual cross-sectional correlation should be weak, a
condition that we check after estimating the model.
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The dynam c p opert es of the glob l model are now det rmined by th Zt r cess,
including impulse esponse functions. In this respect, we can express the reduced form
sho ks as a linear combination of structural shocks εt so that V εt = vt, where structural
shocks are normalized to have unit variance I = E(εtε′t). This implies the restriction that
V V ′ = Ω. In practice, we are interested in identifying two specific columns of V which
characterize the impact effects of unexpected conventional and unconventional monetary
policy shocks stemming from the United States. To do so, we employ a combination of
sign and zero restrictions as detailed in section 2.3.
2.2 Data and Specification of the Model
We consider a panel dataset of quarterly data, whose sample period spans from 1994Q1
to 2016Q4, for 33 countries which altogether account for more than 90% of world GDP.
The countries are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Countries and Regions in the GVAR
Asia and Pacific North America Europe
Australia Canada Austria*
China Mexico Belgium*
India United States Finland*
Indonesia France*
Japan South America Germany*
Korea Argentina Italy*
Malaysia Brazil N therlan s*
New Zealand Chile Norway
Philippines Peru Spain*
Singapore Sweden
Thailand Africa and Middle East Swizerland
Saudi Arabia Turkey
South Africa United Kingdom
Notes: countries marked by * are jointly modelled as a single euro area model.
Regarding the domestic variables Yit, we employ data on real GDP growth, CPI in-
flation, short-term interest rate at annual rate, the spread between long- and short-term
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interest rates, real equity prices, gross capital inflows over GDP, and the nominal effective
exchange rate. Individual models do not include domestic credit flows and credit spreads,
due to lack of available data for m st of the countries. Conversely, international capital
flows data are available for all countries in our sample, and gross (rather than net) inflows
data are employed in order to focus on capital movements initiated by foreigners, in line
with Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2019). Moreover, cap-
ital inflows represent the foreign contribution to domestic credit dynamics, which matters
the most when studying the international dimension of financial cycles. Finally, although
the GVAR appro ch is meant to deal with the curse of dimensionality in large system ,
the coun ry-spe ifi model need to re ain relatively small to keep sufficient degrees of
freedom for the estimation. Thus, the choice of variables is realized as a trade-off between
a parsimonious specification and the coverage of various transmission mechanisms. As in
Dées et al. (2007), we treat the euro area as a single model, by aggregating data of member
countries using their relative GDP shares.7 Due to data limitations, some country models
do not include some specific variables, and Table 4 in Appendix reports the data avail-
ability for each economy. Data for most of the variables come from the GVAR Quarterly
Database recently updated in Mohaddes and Raissi (2018), which we complement with
data from the OECD Main Economic Indicators for equity prices in Brazil, Mexico, and
Turkey, while data for capital inflows come from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.
With respect to the country-specific foreign variables Y ∗it which capture potential inter-
actions across countries, we consider country-specific weighted averages of trade partners’
real GDP growth, CPI inflation, short-term interest rate, real equity prices, and term
spread. Weights are computed using cross-country bilateral trade flows averaged over
the period 1994-2016, where data are also available in the GVAR Quarterly Database
of Mohaddes and Raissi (2018). Due to lack of reliable data across countries on bilat-
eral measures of financial exposure, we do not explore an alternative specification with
financial-based weights. In this respect, Eickmeier and Ng (2015) show that trade and
7It is possible to extend the original GVAR framework by allowing for mixed cross-sections in the
spirit of Gross and Kok (2013). In particular, Georgiadis (2015) considers a mixed cross-section global
VAR in which all euro area economies are included individually while, at the same time, their common
monetary policy is modeled as a function of euro area aggregate variables.
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financial weights can be quite different f r some countries, ut they also document that
the resulting foreign variables strongly correlate with factors obtained from common sta-
tistical dimension-reduction techniques regardless of the chosen weighting scheme. It is
also worth pointing out that the choice of a weighting matrix based on trade weights does
not preclude the presence of financial linkages since the model includes explicit intercon-
nections among financial variables, which are meant to uncover the potential emergence of
a global financial cycle. Moreover, a weighting matrix based on trade flows is particularly
relevant to account for the increasing integration of emerging economies in the global
economy as it remains mostly a trade-related phenomenon (e.g. the role of China as a
major trading partner, or the transmission of shocks via global value chains). Finally, we
include oil prices as global variable in Xt, which endogenously respond to developments of
the world economy by including as feedback variables Y˜t the weighted averages of country-
level output growth and inflation, where weights are based on GDP shares averaged over
the period 1994-2016.
2.3 Identification
The strategy to identify exogenous US monetary policy shocks amounts to impose a
combination of sign restrictions on impulse responses of selected US variables, following
a minimal set of predictions implied by standard monetary theory. At the same time,
the approach leaves unrestricted the responses of all variables of the rest of countries so
to allow for an agnostic identification strategy about the size and sign of international
spillovers.
To provide a comprehensive picture of US monetary policy actions, we explicitly con-
sider not only conventional surprises in the policy rate, but also unconventional monetary
policy measures, the latter intended as a broad mix of measures and communication
aimed at affecting the yield spread while leaving at the same time the policy rate un-
changed.8 The approach of distinguishing both types of measures follows the spirit of
8Woodford (2012) classifies unconventional measures into two broad categories: balance-sheet policies,
according to which the central bank varies either the size or the composition of its balance sheet even
in the absence of any change in its policy rate; and forward guidance, in terms of explicit statements
about the outlook for future policy. Importantly, some of these measures have been employed by the Fed
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Baumeister and Benati (2013). On one hand, a conventional drop of the US short-term
(policy) rate should boost domestic growth, inflation, and equity prices, and should lead
to a depreciation of the US dollar vis-ï£¡-vis the foreign currency. As the shock should
be transitory, the yield curve steepens, the fall in the long-term rate being smaller than
the corresponding fall in the short-term rate. On the other hand, an expansionary un-
conventional monetary policy shock which reduces the domestic term spread should also
boost domestic growth, inflation, and equity prices, and should lead to a depreciation of
the US dollar.9 However the shock should be orthogonal to the conventional monetary
policy surprise, so that the US short-term interest rate should not respond on impact.
As shown in Table 2, these restrictions are sufficient to disentangle the two types of
monetary policy shocks, thus achieving identification. Sign restrictions on US variables are
imposed on impact and one period after the shock, whereas the responses of all variables
in the rest of the countries are left unrestricted. The implementation of the sign and zero
restrictions is b sed on the algorithm recently developed i Arias et al. (2018).10
well before the policy rate reached its effective lower bound. For instance, Gükaynak et al. (2005) and
Campbell et al. (2012) find, respectively for the periods 1990-2004 and 1990-2007, that FOMC forward
guidance announcements were able to shift expectations about the future path of the funds rate, and not
simply through the announcement of a new current policy target.
9As discussed in Baumeister and Benati (2013), a flattening of the yield curve boosts output and
inflation by removing duration risk and reducing borrowing costs for the private sector. Several empirical
papers referenced therein provide supporting evidence to the existence of these transmission channels.
10Specifically, we draw 2000 orthonormal Q matrices satisfying V QQ′V ′ = Ω and store those draws
which satisfy restrictions in Table 2. To reduce the computational burden, we have also experimented
using 500 replications and results are virtually identical. To account for parameter uncertainty, we repeat
the algorithm for each of 500 bootstrap replications of the GVAR.
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Table 2: Identification of US monetary policy shocks
Conventional MP shock Unconventional MP shock
Variable/Country: Uni ed States Other countries United States O her countries
Short-term interest rate – ? 0 ?
Term sp ead + ? – ?
Inflation + ? + ?
Output growth + ? + ?
Real equity prices + ? + ?
NEER – ? – ?
Gross capital infl s ? ? ? ?
Oil price ? ?
Notes: restrictions are imposed on impact and one period after the shock, ? indicates that the response is left
unrestricted. A fall of US NEER indicates a depreciation of the US dollar vis-ï£¡-vis the foreign currency.
2.4 Estimatio
The estimation of the model proceeds on a country-by-country basis as in Pesaran et al.
(2004).11 Specifically, all country-specific models, as well as the model for oil prices, are
estimated by least squares in their VARX form.12 For each country-specific model we
choose a relatively parsimonious lag structure by setting the lag order of the endogenous
variabl s, pi, equal to one. The lag order of coun ry-specific foreign and global v riables,
qi, is also set equal to one. With respe t to the model for oil prices, we fix the lag order
of the endogenous variable px equal to one. Similarly, we set the lag order of the feedback
variables qx equal to one.
Despite the parsimonious lag structure, the model adequately captures the serial cor-
relation of the modeled variables. The autocorrelation functions included in Panel (a) of
Figure 1 indicate that most residuals are serially uncorrelated and therefore the model
11The direct estimation of equation (7) is unfeasible because of the large amount of parameters which
greatly exceeds the number of available observations. In this respect, the country-by-country estimation
allows for reducing the dimensionality of the model.
12Given the relatively short sample period, we abstract from explicitly identifying long-run relationships
among variables, in line with Georgiadis (2016).
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Ta le 2: Identification of US monetary policy shocks
Conv ntional MP shock Unconventional MP shock
Variable/Country: United States Other countries United States Other countries
Short-term interest rate – ? 0 ?
Term spread + ? – ?
Inflation + ? + ?
Output growth + ? + ?
Real equity prices + ? + ?
NEER – ? – ?
Gross capital inflows ? ? ? ?
Oil price ? ?
Notes: restrictions are imposed on impact and one period after the shock, ? indicates that the response is left
unrestric ed. A fall of US NEER indic tes a depreciation of the US do lar vis-ï£¡-vis the foreign currency.
2.4 Estimation
The estimation of the model proceeds on a country-by-country basis as in Pesaran et al.
(2004).11 Specifically, all country-specific models, as well as the model for oil prices, are
estimated by least squares in their VARX form.12 For each country-specific model we
c oose a relatively parsimonious lag structure by setting the lag order of the endogenous
variables, pi, equal to one. The lag order of country-specific foreign and global variables,
qi, is also set equal to one. With respect to the model for oil prices, we fix the lag order
of the endogenous variable px equal to one. Similarly, we set the lag order of the feedback
variables qx equal to one.
Despite the parsimonious lag structure, the model adequately captures the serial cor-
relation of the modeled variables. The autocorrelation functions included in Panel (a) of
Figu e 1 indicate that most resi uals are serially uncorrelated and the fore the model
11The direct estimation of equation (7) is unfeasible because of the large amount of parameters which
greatly exceeds the number of available ob ervations. In this respect, the country-by-country estimation
allows for reducing the dimensionality of the model.
12Given the relatively short sample period, we abstract from explicitly identifying long-run relationships
among variables, in line with Georgiadis (2016).
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captures most of the persistence in the data. In this respect, Panel (b) Figur 1 shows
that the absolute values of all the eigenvalues of the estimated GVAR’s companion matrix
stand below unity. This confirms that the model captures well the complex dynamics and
interactions among variables, and at the same that it is dynamically stable, so that shocks
tend to die out over time with some inertia.
The country-by-country estimation of the model’s parameters hinges on the weak ex-
ogeneity of the foreign variables, which is a formalization of the concept of small open
economy from an econometric perspective. Following Pesaran et al. (2004), we can in-
directly check whether a number of sufficient conditions for this assumption to hold re
verified in our setup. First, weights used in the construction of country-specific foreign
variables should be small, in the sense that squared weights should tend to zero as the
number of countries included in the GVAR increases. Panel (c) in Figure 1 reports the
trade-ba ed weights and shows that, with some excepti s, the vast majority f weights are
small. T e mos notable exceptions ref r to the weights of United States with respect to
Canada and Mexico, those of the euro area with respect to Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
and United Kingdom, as well as the weight of China with respect to South Korea. Second,
there should be cross-sectional weak dependence, meaning that the cross-dependence of
the idiosyncratic shocks is sufficiently small so that it tends to zero as the number of
economies tends to infinity. Panel (d) in Figure 1 plots the cumulative density function
of the pairwise correlations across the estimated residuals (in absolute value). Most of
pairwise correlations are low, for instance about 90% of the mass lies below the 20%
correlation level, hence this confirms that cross-sectional dependence is weak for most of
residuals.
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Figure 1: Diagnostics of the estimated GVAR model
(a) Residual serial dependence (b) Eigenvalues of the GVAR
(c) Trade-based weights matrix
 
(d) Residual cross-sectional dependence
Finally, given the large changes experienced globally over the last decades, we check for
the possibility of structural breaks in the coefficients of the GVAR, by employing several
statistics which test the null hypothesis of parameter stability of each equation for each
country model.13 Table 3 reports the rejection rates of these tests, which measure the
share of equations in which the null of parameter stability is rejected for different levels
13We consider the following traditional tests: the Ploberger and Krämer (1992) maximal OLS cumu-
lative sum statistic, denoted by PKsup and its mean square variant PKmsq, and the heteroskedasticity-
robust versions of the Nyblom (1989) test, denoted by R, of the Quandt (1960) likelihood ratio statistic
(QLR), of the Andrews and Ploberger (1994) mean Wald statistic (MW ) and the exponential average
(APW ) version. The critical values of these tests, computed under the null of parameter stability, are
calculated by bootstrapping the GVAR model.
15
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of significance. Results from all tests coincide in that the null hypothesis of parameter
stability is not rejected for the vast majority of equations. For instance, by looking at
the 5% significance level, the null is rejected at most in 13% of the equations according
to the Nyblom (R) test, while the corresponding figures for the rest of statistics are even
lower. These results are in line with Dées et al. (2007), which highlight that the inclusion
of foreign variables in country-specific models allows for accommodating situations of co-
breaking, that occur when country-specific equations are subject to breaks roughly around
the same time in different economies.14 By accommodating for co-breaking, the struc-
ture of the GVAR is more robust to the possibility of structural breaks than alternative
approaches and thus helps in alleviating the problem of parameter instability.
Table 3: Rejection rates of the null of parameter constancy across country-specific models
Test statistics
Significance level PKsup PKmsq R QLR MW APW
10% 0.18 0.07 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.19
5% 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.07
1% 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.02
Notes: share of equations in which the null of parameter stability is rejected for different significance levels. PKsup and
PKmsq denote the Ploberger and Krämer (1992) maximal OLS cumulative sum statistic and its mean square variant; R
denotes the Nyblom (1989) test; QLR denotes the Quandt (1960) likelihood ratio statistic; MW and APW denote the
Andrews and Ploberger (1994) mean Wald statistic and its exponential average variant. The critical values of these tests,
computed under the null of parameter stability, are calculated by bootstrapping the GVAR model.
3 Results
3.1 US Monet ry Policy and the Global Financial Cycle
We first present results of an expansionary US monetary policy shock which reduces the
US short-term interest rate by 25 basis points on impact.15 Figure 2 reports the median
14Further details on the concept of co-breaking can be found in the seminal work by Hendry (1996), as
well as in Hendry and Mizon (1998).
15Being the model linear in the shock, a contractionary monetary policy shock which increases the US
short-term interest rate by the same amount would lead to the same responses but with switched signs.
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responses for the rest of th w rld, joint with the 16th and 84th percentiles, as well as the
media responses for the United States. On the domestic side, the expansionary shock
improves financial conditions by rising equity prices and gross capital inflows, and stim-
ulates macroeconomic activity and prices. More importantly though, the US monetary
easing triggers a risk-on environment featured by surges of capital inflows in the rest of
the world and increases of international equity prices.16 As a consequence, global GDP
growth and inflation increase, thereby putting upward pressure to oil prices. Global inter-
est rates, which do not react on impact, steadily increase to tame overheating pressures
and reach a peak of 20 basis points after three quarters. Importantly, the shock induces
notable macro-financial spillovers that are generally similar in size to the domestic effects.
These findings are suggestive that the US monetary easing contributes to the emergence
of a Global Financial Cycle which boosts macroeconomic activity worldwide.
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The present d evidence gets further support when focussing on the international trans-
mission of an unexpected flattening of the US yield curve. Again, the monetary easing
boosts international capital flows and equity prices, thereby increasing global growth,
inflation, as well as oil prices. Short-term interest rates gradually increase to dissipate
the overheat in the global economy, reaching about 50 basis points after one year. This
evidence further corroborates the ide that expansionary US monetary policy surpri es
signific tly oost not only macroeconomic but also fin ncial activity worldwide, regard-
less of whether the monetary easing is achieved by a conventional drop in the policy rate
or by a compression of the yield spread.
Figure 3: Domestic and global effects of a compression in US term spread
Notes: median responses for the rest of the world in dashed black, joint with 16th and 84th percentiles, and median
responses for the US in solid red, to an expansionary US monetary policy shock which decreases on impact the US term
spread by 25 basis points. x and y axes measure quarters and percentage points, respectively.
As robustness, we experiment two alternative exercises in which we explore the effects
of US monetary policy by accounting for an effective lower bound in the policy rate. First,
we simulate an unexpected drop in the US shadow interest rate of Wu and Xia (2016), by
imposing the same sign restrictions employed for the conventional monetary policy shock
as reported in Table 2. Second, we simulate an unexpected compression of the US yield
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spread while at the same time imposing that the US short-term interest rate cannot move
over three years from the shock. The latter exercise is practically implemented by zeroing
out the structural US short-term interest rate equation over three years, in the vein of
Baumeister and Benati (2013). As reported in Figure 11 in Appendix, these alternative
simulations yield qualitatively unchanged results.
3.2 Spillovers and Exchange Rate Regimes
In this section we look at previous results with more detail regarding how effects vary
across countries and whether they differ according to exchange rate regimes. By focussing
first on the whole distribution of country-specific spillovers, we provide further evidence
on the role of US monetary policy as a driver of global macroeconomic and financial
cycles. Figure 4 plots the median peak effects (or trough in case of negative responses)
of country-level responses to output growth, equity prices and gross capital inflows, joint
with the 16th and 84th percentiles. Easing US monetary policy leads to economically and
statistically significant increases in capital inflows, equity prices and output growth for
the vast majority of countries. This result holds regardless of whether the expansionary
monetary impulse is implemented via a drop in the policy rate or a flattening of the yield
curve.
Macro-financial spillovers are significant even in economies with floating exchange rate
regimes like the euro area or UK. Nonetheless, a flexible exchange rate could still provide
a partial insulation to the foreign shock, so we formally test whether this is the case.
Specifically, we split our sample in two groups following the IMF’s de facto classification
of exchange rate arrangements: one group consists of those countries whose currency is
independently floating (Floaters), while the other group includes the rest of countries
(Non-floaters).17 Then, we compute group-specific responses to the US monetary policy
shock, as well as their discrepancy. We finally test whether the discrepancy of responses
is statistically different from zero to conclude whether having a floating exchange rate
makes a difference.
17Independently floaters in our sample are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, euro area, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United
Kingdom.
19
spread while at the same time imposing that the US short-term interest rate cannot move
over three years from the shock. The latter exercise is practically implemented by zeroing
out the structural US short-term interest rate equation over three years, in the vein of
Baumeister and Benati (2013). As reported in Figure 11 in Appendix, these alternative
simulations yield qualitatively unchanged results.
3.2 Spillovers and Exchan Rate Regimes
In this section we look at previous results with more detail regarding how effects vary
across countries and whether they differ according to exchange rate regimes. By focussing
first on the whole distribution of country-specific spillovers, we provide further evidence
on the role of US monetary policy as a driver of global macroeconomic and financial
cycles. Figure 4 plots the median peak effects (or trough in case of negative responses)
of country-level responses to output growth, equity prices and gross capital inflows, joint
with the 16th and 84th percentiles. Easing US monetary policy leads to economically and
statistically significant increases in capital inflows, equity prices and output growth for
the vast majority of countries. This result holds regardless of whether the expansionary
monetary impulse is implemented via a drop in the policy rate or a flattening of the yield
curve.
Macro-financial spillovers are significant even in economies with floating exchange rate
regimes like the euro area or UK. Nonetheless, a flexible exchange rate could still provide
a partial insulation to the foreign shock, so we formally test whether this is the case.
Specifically, we split our sample in two groups following the IMF’s de facto classification
of exchange rate arrangements: one group consists of those countries whose currency is
independently floating (Floaters), while the other group includes the rest of countries
(Non-floaters).17 Then, we compute group-specific responses to the US monetary policy
shock, as well as their discrepancy. We finally test whether the discrepancy of responses
is statistically different from zero to conclude whether having a floating exchange rate
makes a difference.
17Independently floaters in our sample are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, euro area, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United
Kingdom.
19
spread while at the same time imposing that the US short-term interest rate cannot move
over three years from the shock. The latter exercise is practically implemented by zeroing
out the structural US short-term interest rate equation over three years, in the vein of
Baumeister and Benati (2013). As reported in Figure 11 in Appendix, these alternative
simulations yield qualitatively unchanged results.
3.2 Spillovers and Exchange Rate Regimes
In this section we look at previous results with more detail regarding how effects vary
across countries and whether they differ according to exchange rate regimes. By focussing
first on the whole distribution of country-specific spillovers, we provide further evidence
on the role of US monetary policy as a driver of global macroeconomic and financial
cycles. Figure 4 plots the median peak effects (or trough in case of negative responses)
of country-level responses to output growth, equity prices and gross capital inflows, joint
with the 16th and 84th percentiles. Easing US monetary policy leads to economically and
statistically significant increases in capital inflows, equity prices and output growth for
the vast majority of countries. This result holds regardless of whether the expansionary
monetary impulse is implemented via a drop in the policy rate or a flattening of the yield
curve.
Macro-financial spillovers are significant even in economies with floating exchange rate
regimes like the euro area or UK. Nonetheless, a flexible exchange rate could still provide
a partial insulation to the foreign shock, so we formally test whether this is the case.
Specifically, we split our sample in two groups following the IMF’s de facto classification
of exchange rate arrangements: one group consists of those countries whose currency is
independently floating (Floaters), while the other group includes the rest of countries
(Non-floaters).17 Then, we compute group-specific responses to the US monetary policy
shock, as well as their discrepancy. We finally test whether the discrepancy of responses
is statistically different from zero to conclude whether having a floating exchange rate
makes a difference.
17Independently floaters in our sample are Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, euro area, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and United
Kingdom.
19
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 23 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1942
Figure 4: Country-level spillover effects to expansionary US monetary policy shocks
(a) Drop of US policy rate
(b) Compression of US term spread
Notes: peak effects (or trough, if negative response), medians, 16th, and 84th percentiles, to an expansionary US monetary
policy shock which either decreases on impact the US short-term rate by 25 basis points (panel a), or which decreases
on impact the US term spread by 25 basis points (panel b). Notice that we exclude gross capital inflows into Singapore,
Switzerland, and United Kingdom due to high values. x axis measures percentage points.
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Figure 5: Exchange rate and spillovers to expansionary US monetary policy shocks
(a) Drop of US policy rate
(b) Compression of US term spread
Notes: median responses joint with 16th and 84th percentiles for the non-floaters (solid red), floaters (dashed blue), and the
discrepancy non-floaters minus floaters (dotted black), to an expansionary US monetary policy shock which either decreases
on impact the US short-term rate by 25 basis points (panel a), or which decreases on impact the US term spread by 25
basis points (panel b). x and y axes measure quarters and percentage points, respectively.
We report results in Figure 5, which shows median responses, joint with the 16th
and 84th percentiles, for the group of Non-floaters, Floaters, and for the discrepancy be-
tween the two group-specific responses. Macro-financial spillovers are generally sizable
and statistically significant both for non-floaters and for countries whose currency is in-
dependently floating. Floaters tend to feature relatively smaller spillovers, for instance in
21
output growth and equity prices, which is in line with the Trilemma predictions. How-
ever, the differential between-group effects are generally not statistically different from
zero. The unique exception is the behavior of the exchange rate, for which we observe a
strong and sudden appreciation in floating economies vis-ï£¡-vis non-floaters. This result
confirms previous country-level evidence that a floating exchange rate cannot offer a full
insulation to US monetary policy shocks and, if anything, having a flexible exchange rate
provides just a limited insulation to foreign shocks.18
3.3 Disentangling the Network Effects of International Spillovers
We have shown that US monetary policy shocks generate strong macroeconomic and
financial spillovers in most countries. In this section we uncover to what extent these
effects get reinforced by the complex network of interactions across countries. To this
end, we compare the estimated effects with those arising from a similar US monetary
policy surprise estimated from a model which does not account for network effects. The
alternative model simplifies in two directions. The first simplification is that the US
economy is exogenous to developments in the rest of the world, so that any potential
spillback effect is shut down. This assumption amounts to drop the set of country-specific
foreign variables from the US model in equation (1), which boils down to
YUS,t = aUS + bUSt+
pUS∑
j=1
AUS,jYUS,t−j +
qUS∑
j=0
CUS,jXt−j + uUS,t (8)
Still, US variables depend on developments in oil prices, Xt. However, while oil prices in
the baseline model are endogenous to global growth and inflation according to (3), here
we allow them to depend just on US developments, by accordingly setting the feedback
variables, Y˜t, equal to its US equivalents.
The second simplification with respect to the baseline specification is that all bilateral
interactions among all countries in the rest of the world are precluded, so that higher order
effects are ruled out. By setting to zero the trade-based weights of all countries excluding
the US, whose weight is equal to one, equation (2) states that the foreign variables of each
18We further refine the analysis by comparing only those countries that feature high levels of capital
controls according to the classification in Fernï£¡ndez et al. (2015). Figures 12 and 13 in Appendix show
that, once controlling for capital controls, qualitative results remain unchanged.
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given economy i are given by the US variab es, Y ∗it = YUS,t. Hence eac country-spec fic
model specified in (1) boils d wn to,
Yit = ai + bit+
pi∑
j=1
AijYi,t−j +
qi∑
j=0
BijYUS,t−j +
qi∑
j=0
CijXt−j + uit for i = US (9)
In this way, each country in the rest of the world depends just on developments in the US
and in the price of oil, the latter being dependent on US variables only. Apart from these
two simplifications, this alternative model keeps the specification of the baseline in terms
of sets of domestic and foreign variables, lag structure, and identification strategy of the
US monetary policy shocks. Figure 6 compares the structure of the benchmark GVAR
with the one of this alternative specification, where each node indicates a country-specific
model and each directional edge measures the relative importance of a country for a given
economy. The benchmark specification in panel (a) allows the US monetary policy shock
to propagate among receiver countries, as well as for spillback effects from countries in
the rest of the world to the US economy itself. Conversely, the alternative specification
in panel (b) let the US monetary impulse to affect all countries altogether, but precludes
the shock to propagate among receiving countries, as well as any second-round effect from
the rest of the world to the US economy.
Figure 6: The GVAR structure with and without network effects
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(a) Benchmark network
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(b) No network effects
Notes: directional edge from country j to country i reflects the relative importance of country j for country i, as measured
by the weight wij . Edges in light blue if wij > 5%, not displayed otherwise. For panel (a), weights are computed using
average bilateral trade flows over the years 1994-2016. For panel (b), weights wij for j = US are set to zero, while weights
wi,US are set to unity.
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Figure 7 compares the domestic and spillover effects, averaged over the first year
from the shock, to US monetary policy surprises implied by the baseline model and the
alternative version that precludes network effects, while Figure 14 in Appendix reports the
full set of responses. Network effects substantially amplify macro-financial spillovers of
expansionary US monetary policy shocks, regardless of whether the easing is undertaken
via conventional or unconventional measures. A 25 basis points drop in US policy rate
implies a more than doubled increase in global growth when network effects are taken
into account (0.08% without network effects versus 0.19% in the baseline), and similarly
so with a 25 basis points compression in the US yield spread (0.12% and 0.28% without
and with network effects, respectively). In the same vein, network effects lead to roughly
doubled increases in global equity prices and capital inflows.
Figure 7: The role of the network for domestic and spillover effects
(a) Drop of US policy rate
(b) Compression of US term spread
Notes: average one-year effects for the rest of the world (RoW) and United States to an expansionary US monetary policy
shock which either decreases on impact the US short-term rate by 25 basis points (panel a), or which decreases on impact
the US term spread by 25 basis points (panel b) for the baseline model (Benchmark) and for an alternative model which
precludes network effects (No network). y axes measure percentage points.
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Interestingly, network effects also amplify the domestic effects of US monetary policy
shocks, and particularly so when considering compressions in the US yield spread. The
boost in domestic growth induced by the monetary easing is about 0.22% without network
effects, and it averages 0.34% when network effects are in place. The corresponding figures
for US equity prices are 6.6% and 11.4%, respectively without and with network effects.
These results confirm the view that international effects of US monetary policy sensibly
spill back onto the evolution of the US economy itself.
Figure 8: The role of the network for spillover effects, country-level evidence
(a) Drop of US policy rate
(b) Compression of US term spread
Notes: average 1-year effects to an expansionary US monetary policy shock which either decreases on impact the US short-
term rate by 25 basis points (panel a), or which decreases on impact the US term spread by 25 basis points (panel b) for the
baseline model (Benchmark) and for an alternative model which precludes network effects (No network). y axes measure
percentage points.
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Overall, we find that the role of US monetary policy in driving not only financial
but also macroeconomic activity on a global scale gets amplified by the complex network
of cross-country interactions. The evidence is even more striking in Figure 8, which
reports the full cross-country distribution of spillovers. Network effects amplify macro-
financial spillovers across the board, with substantial heterogeneity across countries. In
particular, economies which are mostly dependent on the US economy such as Canada
and Mexico expectedly feature smaller amplification effects from the network, while the
opposite holds for economies with a more diversified set of trading partners, such as the
euro area. These results are consistent with Georgiadis (2017), which shows that spillovers
of US monetary policy shocks estimated from models that do not factor in network effects
(such as bilateral VARs) are systematically smaller than those obtained from a GVAR
model, and discrepancies are more pronounced for economies for which the US accounts
for a smaller share of their overall trade and financial integration.
We investigate US monetary policy spillovers further by studying whether changes
occurred in the network structure over the last decades had an effect in shaping the size
of global spillovers. Figure 9 plots the structure of the network as it evolves over time.
It is interesting to observe that while in the pre-2000’s period the United States were
a particularly relevant trade partner for several economies in the Western Hemisphere
(Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and Peru) and in Asia (Japan, Korea, and Philippines), their
relative role has been gradually falling over time, first by losing trade shares in Korea and
Philippines over the years 2000-2007, then by experiencing a drop in trade shares relative
to Brazil, Japan, and Peru after the Great Recession. Overall, the rest of the world has
on average experienced a steady decline in the degree of bilateral integration with the
United States. While the US were accounting for about 25% of trade before of the 2000’s,
this figure has declined to 21% in the early 2000’s and reached about 17% in the most
recent period. This pattern, which is also present in other advanced economies such as
the euro area and Japan, is attributable to the steady rise of emerging economies (and
particularly by China), whose trade share has doubled from 18% to 36% in roughly two
decades.19 Hence specularly, the rest of the world has on average observed an increase
19Following the classification of the IMF World Economic Outlook, the emerging economies in our
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in the degree of global integration vis-ï£¡-vis the rest of the countries excluding the US,
ranging from a trade exposure of 75% in the pre-2000’s up to 83% over the most recent
years.
Figure 9: Evolution of the network structure over time
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(a) Pre-2000’s network
  Argentina
  Australia
  Brazil
  China
  Singapore
  UK
  Euro area   India
  S. Africa
  Indonesia
  Chile
  Malaysia  Mexico
  Norway
  Japan
  S. Arabia
  Peru   Philippines
  Turkey
  N. Zealand
  Sweden
  Switzerland
  Thailand
  Canada
  Korea
  United States
(b) Early 2000’s network
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(c) Post-crisis network
Notes: directional edge from country j to country i reflects the relative importance of country j for country i, as measured
by the weight wij . Edges in dark blue if wij > 25%, in light blue if wij ∈ (10%, 25%), and not displayed if wij < 10%.
Weights are computed using average bilateral trade flows over the years 1994-1999 (Pre-2000’s network), over the period
2000-2007 (Early 2000’s network), and over the period 2008-2016 (Post-crisis network).
To study the implications of these shifts in the cross-country network, we explore
alternative versions of the GVAR by sequentially varying the trade-based weights matrix
employed to construct country-specific foreign variables in equation (2). Namely, we
consider three models that exploit data on average bilateral trade flows over the years
1994-1999 (Pre-2000’s network), over 2000-2007 (Early 2000’s network), and over 2008-
2016 (Post-crisis network). Apart from the cross-country weights matrix, all models are
estimated over the same sample and share the specifications of the baseline model, so that
we can assess the role of the network structure as it evolved over time.
Figure 10 reports the spillover effects on the global economy (excluding the US), to the
two types of expansionary US monetary policy surprises. Two results are worth pointing
out. First, network effects tend to amplify the spillover effects of US monetary policy,
regardless the choice of the network structure and whether the easing is undertaken via
conventional or unconventional measures. In fact, the model without cross-country net-
work implies systematically smaller effects than those obtained by the alternative versions
sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.
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that account for both bilateral interactions among receiver countries and spillback effects
to the US economy. Second, the amplification of the network tends to increase as the
network evolves over time, and especially so in the case of a traditional policy rate drop.
With the pre-2000’s network structure in place, a 25 basis points drop of the US policy
rate boosts global growth and equity prices by 0.15% and 3.8% respectively. The same
figures are higher and average nearly 0.20% and 5.8% with the most recent post-Great
Recession network, and a similar picture arises regarding the effect on global capital flows.
Overall, these findings suggest that the evolution of the network is an important driver
of the increasing role of US monetary policy in shaping the Global Financial Cycle.
Figure 10: Spillover effects and the evolving role of the network
(a) Drop of US policy rate
(b) Compression of US term spread
Notes: average one-year effects for the rest of the world (RoW) to an expansionary US monetary policy shock which either
decreases on impact the US short-term rate by 25 basis points (panel a), or which decreases on impact the US term spread
by 25 basis points (panel b) for the model which exploits data on average bilateral trade flows over the years 1994-1999
(Pre-2000’s network), over the period 2000-2007 (Early 2000’s network), over the period 2008-2016 (Post-crisis network),
and for the model which precludes network effects (No network). y axes measure percentage points.
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To study the implications of these shifts in the cross-country network, we explore
alternative versions of the GVAR by sequentially varying the trade-based weights matrix
employed to construct country-specific foreign variables in equation (2). Namely, we
consider three models that exploit data on average bilateral trade flows over the years
1994-1999 (Pre-2000’s network), over 2000-2007 (Early 2000’s network), and over 2008-
2016 (Post-crisis network). Apart from the cross-country weights matrix, all models are
estimated over the same sample and share the specifications of the baseline model, so that
we can assess the role of the network structure as it evolved over time.
Figure 10 reports the spillover effects on the global economy (excluding the US), to the
two types of expansionary US monetary policy surprises. Two results are worth pointing
out. First, network effects tend to amplify the spillover effects of US monetary policy,
regardless the choice of the network structure and whether the easing is undertaken via
conventional or unconventional measures. In fact, the model without cross-country net-
work implies systematically smaller effects than those obtained by the alternative versions
sample are Argentina, Braz l, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.
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4 Conclusions
The recent view of the Global Financial Cycle has emphasized the existence of powerful
financial spillovers of US monetary policy to the rest of the world, even in countries with
floating exchange rate regimes. Since US monetary policy endogenously responds to the
global consequences of its own measures, its role in driving the Global Financial Cycle
could get potentially amplified by spillback effects and more generally by the complex
network of cross-country interactions that arise in an highly integrated global economy.
We investigate this possibility by means of an estimated GVAR, a multi-country empirical
framework which models the global economy as a network of interdependent countries. We
identify (un)conventional US monetary policy shocks using theory-based sign restrictions
on selected responses of US variables, while at the same time leaving unrestricted the
responses of all variables in the rest of countries so to allow for an agnostic identification
strategy about the size and sign of international spillovers.
We show that unexpected expansionary US monetary policy surprises contribute to
the emergence of a Global Financial Cycle that boosts macroeconomic activity worldwide,
regardless of whether the monetary easing is achieved by a conventional drop in the policy
rate or by a flattening of the yield curve. We lso find that economies with floating
exchange rate regimes are not fully insulated from US monetary policy shocks and, even
though they appear to be relatively less affected by the shocks, the differences in responses
across exchange rate regimes are not statistically significant. Importantly, the role of
US monetary policy in driving these macro-financial spillovers gets even reinforced by
the complex network of interactions across countries, to the extent that network effects
roughly double the direct impacts of US monetary policy surprises on international equity
prices, capital flows, and global growth. This amplification increases as countries get more
globally integrated over time, suggesting that the evolving network is an important driver
for the increasing role of US monetary policy in shaping the Global Financial Cycle.
The channels through which countries interact are several, complex, and still not fully
understood, and this question, which goes beyond the scope of our paper, is left for
future research. Nonetheless our analysis highlights that accounting for such a network of
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cross-country interrelationships is a sensible dimension to consider in the current debate.
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A Other Tables and Figures
Table 4: Data availability for each country-specific model
Output Inflation Short-term Term NEER Real equity Gross capital
growth rate spread prices inflows
Argentina X X X X X X
Australia X X X X X X X
Brazil X X X X X X
Canada X X X X X X X
Chile X X X X X X
China X X X X X
Euro area X X X X X X X
India X X X X X X X
Indonesia X X X X X
Japan X X X X X X X
Korea X X X X X X X
Malaysia X X X X X X
Mexico X X X X X X
New Zealand X X X X X X X
Norway X X X X X X X
Peru X X X X X
Philippines X X X X X X
Saudi Arabia X X X X
Singapore X X X X X X
South Africa X X X X X X X
Sweden X X X X X X X
Switzerland X X X X X X X
Thailand X X X X X X
Turkey X X X X X X
United Kingdom X X X X X X X
United States X X X X X X X
Notes: quarterly data, 1994Q1-2016Q4. Data are from the GVAR Quarterly Database recently updated in Mohaddes and
Raissi (2018), with the exception of equity prices in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey which are from the OECD Main
Economic Indicators, and of gross capital inflows, whose data come from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics.
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Figure 11: Accounting for the effective lower bound of US policy rate
(a) US shadow rate
(b) ZLB on US short-rate
Notes: median responses for the rest of the world in dashed black, joint with 16th and 84th percentiles, and median
responses for the US in solid red, to an expansionary US monetary policy shock which either decreases on impact the US
shadow rate of Wu and Xia (2016) by 25 basis points (panel a), or decreases on impact the US term spread by 25 basis
points while at the same time imposing that the US short-term interest rate cannot move over three years from the shock
(panel b). x and y axes measure quarters and percentage points, respectively.
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Figure 12: Exchange rate and spillovers, high capital controls countries
(a) Drop of US policy rate
(b) Compression of US term spread
Notes: median responses joint with 16th and 84th percentiles for the high capital controls non-floaters (solid red), floaters
(dashed blue), and their discrepancy (dotted black), to an expansionary US monetary policy shock which either decreases
on impact the US short-term rate by 25 basis points (panel a), or which decreases on impact the US term spread by 25
basis points (panel b). x and y axes measure quarters and percentage points, respectively.
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Figure 13: Exchange rate and spillovers, low capital controls countries
(a) Drop of US policy rate
(b) Compression of US term spread
Notes: median responses joint with 16th and 84th percentiles for the low capital controls non-floaters (solid red), floaters
(dashed blue), and their discrepancy (dotted black), to an expansionary US monetary policy shock which either decreases
on impact the US short-term rate by 25 basis points (panel a), or which decreases on impact the US term spread by 25
basis points (panel b). x and y axes measure quarters and percentage points, respectively.
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Figure 14: Spillover, network, and direct effects of US monetary policy shocks
(a) Drop of US policy rate
(b) Compression of US term spread
Notes: median responses for the rest of the world in dashed black line, joint with 16th and 84th percentiles, and median
responses for the US in solid red, to an expansionary US monetary policy shock which either decreases on impact the US
short-term rate by 25 basis points (panel a) or decreases on impact the US term spread (panel b), for the baseline model
(Benchmark) and for an alternative model which precludes network effects (No network). x and y axes measure quarters
and percentage points, respectively. 39
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